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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“This is our greatest fear, that, one day, a terrorist attack will succeed 
because law enforcement could not gain immediate access to the 
plaintext of an encrypted message . . . .”1 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) identified Zacarias 
Moussaoui as a possible “last-minute” substitute and likely the twentieth 
hijacker in the September 11 atrocity.2 After training at one of Osama bin 
Laden’s terrorist camps in Afghanistan, Moussaoui moved to London a 
year before the attack. Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, an al Qaeda member, flew to 
London immediately before Moussaoui left for his mission.3 Al-Shibh, who 
roomed in Germany with Mohamed Atta, the mastermind of the September 
11 attacks, tried to obtain an American visa four times between May and 
October but was denied each time.4 Needing a replacement, al-Shibh is 
thought to have briefed his close friend, Moussaoui, of the situation. 
Moussaoui is believed to have then traveled to the United States in al-
Shibh’s place.5 Once in the United States, Moussaoui deposited $32,000 in 
cash into a new bank account and began taking flying lessons in Norman, 
Oklahoma.6 Later, Moussaoui received $14,000 from al-Shibh who also 
had wired money to Marwan al-Shehhi,7 Atta’s nephew and the terrorist  
 
 
 
 
 1. Charles Barry Smith, Current U.S. Encryption Regulations: A Federal Law 
Enforcement Perspective, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 11, 16 (2000). 
 2. Chitra Ragavan, The Case of a ‘20th Hijacker’?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 
24, 2001, at 20. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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who piloted United Airlines Flight 175 into the South Tower of the World 
Trade Center.8 
Given all this, it was not until Moussaoui moved to Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, that warning bells started to ring. Moussaoui enrolled at the Pan 
Am International Flight Academy in Minneapolis to be trained in flying the 
bigger jumbo jets,9 specifically 747s.10 While training on simulators at the 
flight school, he informed his instructors that “[h]e wanted to concentrate 
only on the midair turns, not the takeoffs and landings.”11 The flight school 
notified the FBI about this suspicious behavior, and that agency later 
arrested Moussaoui for remaining in the United States on an expired visa.12 
Although the FBI arrested Moussaoui, who otherwise might have 
been a pilot in the September 11 attacks, authorities failed to detect the 
other terrorists. The U.S. authorities failed to discover Mohamed Atta, 
Waleed al-Shehri, Wail al-Shehri, Abdulaziz al-Omari, and Satam al-
Suqami, who flew American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower of the 
World Trade Center.13 Similarly, they failed to detect Ahmed al-Ghamdi, 
Marwan al-Shehhi, Fayez Ahmed, Mohald al-Shehri, and Hamza al-
Ghamdi, who hijacked and aimed United Airlines Flight 175 into the South 
Tower of the World Trade Center.14 Authorities never discovered terrorists 
Khalid al-Mihdhar, Nawaq al-Hamzi, Hani Hanjour, Salem al-Hamzi, and 
Majed Moqed, who directed American Airlines Flight 77 into the 
Pentagon,15 or Saeed al-Ghamdi, Ziad al-Jarrah, Ahmed al-Nami, and 
Ahmed al-Haznawi, who commandeered United Airlines Flight 93 that 
crashed in Pennsylvania, but allegedly attempted to hit the White House.16 
In the wake of the September 11 attacks, many Americans are asking 
the same question: How could U.S. authorities and intelligence agencies 
fail to detect the September 11 plot? With the exception of a few of the 
terrorists, they were young and needed direction.17 They needed money to 
carry out their missions and, most importantly, they needed intelligence to 
help plan and coordinate that fateful day. Where were the communications 
 
 8. Search for the Missing Pieces, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 23, 2001, at 
Features. 
 9. Susan Headden et al., The Banality of Evil, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 1, 2001, 
at 25-26. 
 10. Evan Thomas et al., The Road to September 11, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 1, 2001, at 38. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Search for the Missing Pieces, supra note 8. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. 
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between the leaders in Afghanistan and the terrorists here in the United 
States? Where were the communications that would have signaled the 
intelligence agencies that an attack on the United States was imminent? 
Even now, a year and a half after the attack, the question of how the 
terrorists communicated remains a mystery.18 
Newspapers and magazines quickly pointed the finger, but many 
could not conclude who was to blame.19 They have, however, noticed one 
common thread that runs through many of the FBI reports from both before 
and after the terrorist attacks on September 11—the Internet played a key 
role in planning the terrorist attacks.20 
This Note argues that although privacy and economic concerns have 
ruled the encryption debate during the past decade, the move toward 
increased privacy on the Internet and relaxed encryption regulation, 
designed to promote electronic commerce (“e-commerce”), comes at the 
expense of national security and the protection of Americans’ safety. Part II 
of this Note provides background on encryption. In particular, Part II 
explains encryption and details its use throughout history. Additionally, 
Part II examines how businesses use encryption to secure their 
communications and financial transactions on the Internet. This Section 
also observes that this technology is employed by terrorist organizations to 
accomplish the same goal: to send private communications. Part III details 
the history of encryption regulation during the last decade and addresses 
why the government has relaxed its stance even though encryption 
ultimately poses such a threat. Part IV analyzes whether encryption 
regulation will provide the intelligence community the tools to deal with 
terrorists who are now technologically savvy, or whether regulation will 
hurt the nation’s already wounded economy. Part V examines Magic 
Lantern, cutting-edge technology developed by the FBI that effectively 
incorporates the privacy benefits of encryption while still providing 
Americans protection in this new era of terrorism. More specifically, Part V 
will argue this new technology should be implemented because it balances 
privacy and economic concerns with national security needs. Finally, Part 
VI will conclude by proposing the adoption of the FBI’s new technology as 
a way to protect privacy and economic concerns while ensuring national 
security. 
 
 18. See generally Kevin Whitelaw, Unanswered Questions: There Are Still Big Gaps in 
What Is Known About the 9/11 Plotters, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 9, 2002, at 28. 
 19. See generally Search for the Missing Pieces, supra note 8. 
 20. See Associated Press, Attacks Renew Encryption Debate (Sept. 24, 2001). 
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II.  HISTORY OF ENCRYPTION 
“If all the personal computers in the world—260 million computers—
were put to work on a single [strongly encrypted] message, it would 
still take an estimated 12 million times the age of the universe . . . to 
break a single message . . . .”21 
A. What Is Encryption? 
Encryption is a technique that changes a plaintext message from its 
original form by replacing or rearranging the letters and numbers and 
converting the message into an indecipherable form using a mathematical 
algorithm and a key.22 The length of the encryption key is measured in bits 
and determines the strength of the encryption program.23 For example, an 
encryption key that is 40 bits in length yields 1 billion possible keys or 
combinations, a key with 56 bits has 72 trillion, and a key that measures 
128 bits produces a gazillion solutions.24 
There are two types of encryption systems: private-key and public-
key.25 Encryption systems began with private-key systems that use 
algorithms and a symmetric key to encrypt and decrypt messages.26 
Private-keys are less private because they run into a fundamental problem. 
Since “the same key is used to both encrypt and decrypt the message,” the 
key must be e-mailed to the receiver in order for the message to be 
decrypted and read.27 Private-key encryption systems offer limited security 
because encrypted messages can be read if a third party intercepts the key 
when it is transmitted from the sender to the receiver.28 This flaw thwarted 
early efforts for businesses and the public to use encryption effectively  
and safely.29 
 
 21. Security and Freedom Through Encryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 695 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, 105th Cong. 45 (1997) (statement 
of William P. Crowell, Deputy Director, National Security Agency). 
 22. J. Terrence Stender, Note, Too Many Secrets: Challenges to the Control of Strong 
Crypto and the National Security Perspective, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 287, 294-95 
(Winter 1998); see also Kurt M. Saunders, The Regulation of Internet Encryption 
Technologies: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. 
L. 945, 947-48 (Spring 1999). 
 23. Marc S. Friedman, Some Observations on Encryption—Plain, Simple, and 
Unencrypted, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 8 (2000). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Tricia E. Black, Note, Taking Account of the World An It Will Be: The Shifting 
Course of U.S. Encryption Policy, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 289, 296 (2001). 
 26. See Stender, supra note 22, at 295. 
 27. Black, supra note 25, at 296. 
 28. Id.; see also Stender, supra note 22, at 295. 
 29. See Stender, supra note 22, at 295-96. 
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The invention of public-key encryption in the mid-1970s solved the 
weakness of private-key systems.30 Public-key encryption systems require 
two asymmetrical keys: one used by the sender to encrypt (called a public-
key) and another used by the receiver to decrypt (called a private-key).31 
Although these keys are a matched set and “mathematically related,” it is 
impossible to decrypt the message by accessing only the public-key 
because the private-key decrypts the message.32 Thus, the receiver 
publishes his public-key so that the sender may use it to encrypt the 
message he wishes to send to the receiver.33 The second key, the private-
key, is held only by the receiver, who keeps it private so that only he may 
decrypt the message.34 Therefore, the sender looks up the receiver’s 
published public-key, encrypts the message utilizing the receiver’s public-
key, and then sends the message to the receiver.35 The receiver then 
decrypts the message by using his private-key, which only he can access.36 
If the receiver wants to respond to the sender, he would complete the same 
process in reverse. 
Once a message is encrypted, it can be read one of two ways. First, as 
mentioned above, the receiver can use a private-key to access and decrypt 
the message. The second method, a “Brute Force Attack,” is far more 
complex and occurs when a computer program attempts to use all possible 
keys to crack the encryption code.37 In layman’s terms, this is the 
equivalent of a man holding a key ring with millions of keys, trying each 
key in the lock until he finds one that matches. This process devours 
massive amounts of computer power and takes an inordinate amount of 
time.38 
 
 
 
 30. Id. at 296. 
 31. Id. at 295. 
 32. See id. at 296. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Black, supra note 25, at 296. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Andres Rueda, The Implications of Strong Encryption Technology on Money 
Laundering, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2001); Stender, supra note 22, at 287; Bernadette 
Barnard, Leveraging Worldwide Encryption Standards Via U.S. Export Controls: The U.S. 
Government’s Authority to “Safeguard” The Global Information Infrastructure, 1997 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 435. 
 38. Interview by Russell D. Hoffman with Phil Zimmerman, Author of PGP, WALE 
Radio (Feb. 2, 1996), available at http://animatedsoftware.com/hightech/philspgp.htm. 
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B. Background on Encryption 
Although encryption may appear to be a modern phenomenon, it can 
be traced back to 1900 B.C.39 Governments and militaries used 
cryptography to keep their secrets safe.40 One of the earliest forms of 
cryptography was developed and used by Julius Caesar to send his military 
orders safely.41 The aptly named Caesar Cipher is a simple substitution 
cipher and employs the use of two alphabets, one directly written above the 
other.42 The bottom alphabet is moved to the right (or left) of the top 
alphabet.43 The bottom letters then represent the letters in the top 
alphabet.44 For example, if the bottom alphabet was shifted one letter to the 
right an A would represent a B, a B would represent a C, and so on. Thus, 
using this cipher text, the word PLANE would be enciphered QMBOF. 
This message would be kept secret because only the sender and the 
recipient of the message would know how to rearrange the letters to 
convert the cipher text into plaintext. In addition, changing the code at 
regular intervals can enhance the security of the messages.45 
Since that time, cryptography has become more complex.46 During 
World War I and World War II, encryption played an integral role and 
helped secure victories for the United States.47 For example, in World War 
II the “Purple” codes used by the Japanese and the “Ultra” codes used by 
the Germans were thought to be “unbreakable.”48 The United States’ efforts 
and advancements in cryptography helped crack the codes and were vital in 
winning the war.49 
 
 39. History: The Origins of Encryption, available at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/class/ 
6k180_park/Student-Reports/rnation/History.htm. 
 40. Stender, supra note 22, at 289. 
 41. See Adam C. Bonin, Protecting Protection: First and Fifth Amendment Challenges 
to Cryptography Regulation, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 495, 497 (1996). 
 42. Daniel Olson, Analysis of Criminal Codes and Ciphers, 2 FORENSIC SCI. COMM., 
(2000), available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/fsc/backissu/jan2000/olson.htm. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See generally History: The Origins of Encryption, supra note 39; see also Black, 
supra note 25, at 294. 
 47. See Stender, supra note 22, at 300; see also Joel C. Mandelman, Lest We Walk into 
the Well: Guarding the Keys–Encrypting the Constitution: To Speak, Search, and Seize in 
Cyberspace, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 227, 230 (1998). 
 48. Mandelman, supra note 47, at 230; see also Olson, supra note 42; Stender, supra 
note 22, at 300. 
 49. See Mandelman, supra note 47, at 230. 
VOORS FINAL 3/6/2003 11:20 AM 
338 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55 
C. Recent Encryption Advancements 
Recent advancements made encryption more available so its use was 
no longer limited to military and government.50 In the mid-1970s, two 
scientists from Stanford University invented public-key encryption.51 This 
advancement allowed messages to be encrypted, sent, and decrypted 
without e-mailing the sender’s private-key.52 As discussed infra, this 
eliminated the threat that the private-key might be intercepted and 
subsequently compromise the safety of later messages.53 
In the early to mid-1980s, Phil Zimmerman developed software that 
implemented the concept of public-key encryption and revolutionized the 
world’s perception of encryption.54 Pretty Good Privacy (“PGP”), as the 
software is called, was released in the early 1990s.55 The program extended 
the use of encryption from major governments and militaries to ordinary 
businesses and private citizens.56 
Although PGP was a boon to many businesses and private 
individuals, the United States government did not agree. In fact, the 
government deemed encryption software vital to preserving national 
security.57 The State Department classified it as a munition and listed it in 
the Arms Export Control Act with other military weapons such as machine 
guns, bombs, and missiles, thus prohibiting it from export without a 
license.58 Aware of this, Zimmerman gave away PGP for free on the 
Internet.59 The government, however, decided that providing PGP on the 
Internet constituted an export.60 This decision prompted the U.S. 
government to conduct a three-year investigation of Zimmerman for 
violating the Arms Export Control Act.61 After a lengthy investigation, 
however, Zimmerman was never prosecuted.62 
 
 50. See Stender, supra note 22, at 296. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
 54. Interview by Russell D. Hoffman with Phil Zimmerman, Author of PGP, WALE 
Radio (Feb. 2, 1996), available at http://animatedsoftware.com/hightech/philspgp.htm. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. 
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D. Use of Encryption by Business and the Service Industry 
The use of encryption systems is no longer limited strictly to military 
use. Businesses, hospitals, utilities, and communications companies use 
encryption to protect their information from being compromised.63 
Increasingly, businesses are utilizing the Internet and incorporating their 
sales and marketing plans to include e-commerce.64 In fact, experts 
predicted in 1998 that “[b]y 2002, the Internet may be used for more than 
$300 billion worth of commerce between businesses.”65 To effectively 
utilize e-commerce, businesses can guarantee the safety of their 
communications by using encryption.66 Without such safety measures in 
place, customers who conduct financial transactions or make credit card 
purchases may fall prey to those who exploit such information.67 For 
example, Amazon.com, one of the largest online retailers, uses encryption 
to secure customers’ personal information and credit card numbers.68 
Similarly, Ameritrade, one of the largest online stock trading companies, 
uses encryption to ensure the security of its customers’ stock trades.69 
Additionally, Web browsers, such as Internet Explorer and Netscape, use 
encryption to secure their users’ credit card transactions.70 
Hospitals also use encryption to ensure the privacy of patients’ 
records.71 In an effort to cut costs and increase access to information, 
hospitals began storing medical records in their computers, thus allowing 
 
 63. See Black, supra note 25, at 294; see also Mandelman, supra note 47, at 236-37; 
Saunders, supra note 22, at 945. 
 64. See generally Lynn Margherio et al., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, THE 
EMERGING DIGITAL ECONOMY (1998), available at http://www.esa.doc.gov/508/esa/ 
TheEmergingDigitalEconomy.htm. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Black, supra note 25, at 294. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Amazon.com, Credit Card Security, at http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/ 
browse/-/468494/ref=hp_hp_ct_4_3/103-5728187-0035819: 
The Amazon.com Safe Shopping Guarantee protects you while you shop at 
Amazon.com, so that you never have to worry about credit card safety. Period. . . . 
It encrypts all of your personal information, including credit card number, name, 
and address, so that it cannot be read as the information travels over the Internet. 
Id. 
 69. Ameritrade.com Security Statement, at http://www.ameritrade.com/tell_me_more/ 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2002): “It is the policy of the Ameritrade Secure Trading System to 
encrypt the transmission of all personal or financial Web-based information that is 
transmitted between our site and your browser.” Id. 
 70. Carrie Kirby, New Encryption Laws for E-mail Unlikely, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 6, 2001, 
at B1, available at 2001 WL 3416304. 
 71. See Paul Korzeniowski, VPNs Become Key Part of Enterprise Networks; 
Technology Information, BUS. COMM. REV., Mar. 2000, at 28. 
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them to be accessed by patients, doctors, and other health care personnel.72 
St. Vincent Hospital, in Birmingham, Alabama, for example, recently 
upgraded its encryption from 40 bits to 128 bits to ensure the privacy of its 
patients’ medical records.73 Others in the medical field have followed suit. 
For example, a medical practice in Palo Alto, California, electronically 
stores patients’ medical records to give medical personnel easier access to 
the records and to improve communication between doctors and nurses.74 
E. Use of Encryption by Terrorist Organizations 
Although encryption is necessary for businesses’ success on the 
Internet, it is also becoming a sinister tool for terrorist organizations to 
keep their plans and communications secret.75 The FBI’s success in 
detecting and preventing terrorist activities depends largely on its ability to 
gather this type of intelligence.76 Thus, in the words of Louis Freeh, former 
Director of the FBI: “[U]nbreakable encryption ultimately will devastate 
our ability to fight crime and prevent terrorism. . . . [and] will allow drug 
lords, spies, terrorists and even violent gangs to communicate . . . with 
impunity.”77 Experts and the public as a whole are beginning to realize that 
new technology revolutionizes legitimate businesses as well as terrorist 
organizations. “The new terrorism is of a different genre. . . . It does not 
consist of guerillas sheltering in the countryside making occasional 
incursions into the cities, but. . . . makes use of air travel and the Internet. It 
uses similar encryption algorithms to hide its internal communications.”78 
The FBI estimates that more than 1,000 foreign nationals with 
suspected terrorist ties currently live in the United States.79 Previous attacks 
 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. at 32. 
 74. Rick Whiting, Patient-Privacy Issue Gets a Doctor’s Care, INFORMATIONWEEK, 
Dec. 24, 2001, at 40. 
 75. Threat of Terrorism to the United States: Statement before the U.S. Senate Comms. 
on Appropriations, Armed Servs., and Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. (2001) 
[hereinafter Threat of Terrorism to the United States] (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, 
FBI), available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/freeh051001.htm. 
 76. Counterterrorism and Infrastructure Protection: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the 
Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. 45 (1999) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, 
Director, FBI). 
 77. The Impact of Encryption on Public Safety and Law Enforcement, Focusing on the 
Security Needs of Business and Industry and the Use of Encryption by Organized Crime and 
Terrorists: Hearing before the Senate Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t Info., 
Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 105th Cong. 43 (1997) (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, 
FBI). 
 78. George Yeo, S’pore a Free Port but it Will Give No Quarter to Terrorism, THE 
STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Oct. 12, 2001, at 26, available at LEXIS News Library. 
 79. Thomas et al., supra note 10, at 38. 
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by Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization indicate that sleeper cells, 
consisting of a number of al Qaeda followers, journey to the target country 
to live until they are told when, where, and how to carry out their attacks.80 
The terrorists responsible for the attack on the United States lived among 
us for a year81 performing everyday activities including doing laundry, 
working out, eating pizza, and shopping at local malls and grocery stores.82 
One neighbor described them as “five good guys,”83 and others believed the 
terrorists were “students from the university.” 84 
In between these times of normal behavior, the terrorists also planned 
for their upcoming attack. They enrolled in flight school and practiced their 
piloting skills, which would be needed when the time came.85 They also 
bought box cutters that were used to take the planes by force.86 In addition, 
the “tech-savvy hijackers . . . appeared to use a web of electronic 
connections to plan and communicate in relative anonymity.”87 
One source called bin Laden’s group “the coming thing in the age of 
modern terrorism.”88 The head of the U.S. National Security Agency 
voiced his concern that al Qaeda’s growing use of the Internet and 
encryption to hide communications has eluded even U.S. technology.89 
George Tenet, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, told Congress 
recently that al Qaeda is “the nation’s most immediate and serious 
transnational threat.”90 U.S. officials report that “encryption has become the 
everyday tool of Muslim extremists . . . . It’s become so fundamental to the 
operations of these groups that bin Laden and other Muslim extremists are 
teaching it at their camps in Afghanistan and Sudan.”91 Bin Laden’s 
terrorist organization has advanced and become more sophisticated. The 
organization relies on computers and advanced encryption techniques to 
 
 80. Id. at 40. 
 81. Edward T. Pound, Under Seige, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 24, 2001, at 10. 
 82. Headden et al., supra note 9, at 23. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 24. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. David Fallis and Ariana Eunjung Cha, Agents Following Suspects’ Lengthy 
Electronic Trail; Web of Connections Used to Plan Attack, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2001, at 
A24. 
 88. Peter Grier, A Terrorist Version of NATO?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 16, 
2001, at 1. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Jack Kelley, Terror Groups Hide Behind Web Encryption, USA TODAY, Feb. 15, 
2001, available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/2001-02-05-binladen.htm. 
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communicate through encrypted e-mail.92 In addition, the al Qaeda network 
employs “top-notch software engineers.”93 This new technology makes it 
more difficult to gather intelligence and to expose bin Laden’s plans of 
terror. Currently, bin Laden uses powerful encryption devices that are 
commercially available and increasingly easy to obtain.94 
Although the FBI investigation has not yet found any direct evidence 
that encryption played a role in the September 11 attacks, there is 
conclusive evidence that terrorists, including those in bin Laden’s al Qaeda 
network, used encryption to encode phone communications and e-mails.95 
The investigation of Ramzi Yousef, the terrorist who planned and directed 
the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Center, uncovered that Yousef used 
encryption in a plot to destroy eleven U.S. commercial airliners.96 In 1998, 
Wadih El Hage, one of the terrorists suspected of bombing the U.S. 
embassies in east Africa, sent encrypted e-mails to members of al Qaeda 
before the bombings took place.97 In 1999, Khalil Deek used encryption to 
plan bombings in Jordan.98 More recently, “[s]even months [before the 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon], a widely quoted 
newspaper report had claimed that bin Laden’s followers were operating a 
communications network based on encrypted messages concealed inside 
pornographic pictures.”99 
Bin Laden’s resume of terror also includes other attacks that evidence 
the use of encryption: 
• February 26, 1993: World Trade Center bombed; 6 killed and 
more than 1,000 injured;100 
• October 3, 1993: 18 American service men attacked and killed in 
Somalia;101 
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• August 7, 1998: U.S. embassies bombed in Africa, 301 killed and 
5000 injured;102 
• October 12, 2000: U.S.S. Cole attacked while in Yemen, 17 
killed, 39 injured;103 
• September 11, 2001: World Trade Center and Pentagon attacked, 
thousands killed and injured.104 
Although the reports only allege encryption was used to plan 
September 11, hard evidence proves the terrorists used the Internet to plan 
their attacks.105 “FBI assistant director Ron Dick, head of the US National 
Infrastructure Protection Centre, told reporters that the hijackers had used 
the net, and ‘used it well.’”106 In one instance, two of the hijackers 
equipped with laptops would not check into a Hollywood, Florida, hotel 
unless they had around-the-clock Internet access in their room.107 When the 
terrorists learned that such access was not available, they became angry and 
left.108 The terrorists also used the Internet to purchase “at least nine of 
their [airline] tickets for the four doomed September 11 flights.”109 The 
terrorists frequently used computers at public libraries to access the 
Internet110 and used the Web to steal social security numbers and obtain 
fake drivers’ licenses.111 
III.  ENCRYPTION REGULATION OVER THE LAST DECADE 
The regulation of encryption has been a compromise between 
protecting our national security by restricting access to encryption used 
abroad, and recognizing businesses’ legitimate need for this technology 
overseas. Early in our history, the U.S. government realized the important 
role that encryption could play in keeping military communications 
secret.112 To keep this technology firmly in American hands, the 
government worked to place restrictions on encryption both domestically 
and abroad.113 
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A. The Struggle Between National Security and an Evolving 
Global Economy 
As the U.S. economy evolved and expanded overseas, it became 
apparent that the use of encryption technology proved as vital to business 
as it was to the military.114 As evidence of this, the government classified 
encryption as a “dual-use” technology, meaning it had both military and 
civilian use.115 This opened the door for businesses and average citizens to 
use encryption to keep their information secret.116 The government, 
however, restricted the types of encryption programs used overseas.117 
The government’s policy, aimed at protecting national security, came 
at the expense of our nation’s economy. Export regulations mandated that 
encryption software sent abroad possess limited key length, thus 
diminishing the strength of the program.118 Businesses that demanded 
stronger encryption programs to protect their information had to submit to a 
governmental review to obtain a license to export higher-strength 
encryption programs.119 This policy left overseas American businesses with 
the choice of using less than full strength software to protect their 
information or subjecting themselves to a protracted governmental review 
process. In addition, export restrictions left software companies that 
produced encryption programs unable to compete with foreign software 
companies that did not have to comply with the stringent U.S. 
regulations.120 
B. Regulation of Encryption Through Export Restrictions 
Before 1996, the State Department restricted the export of encryption 
programs through the Arms Export Control Act, the Export Administration 
Regulations (“EAR”), and the International Traffic in Arms Regulation 
(“ITAR”).121 EAR allowed the export of products using only a general 
license.122 The government’s classification of encryption software as a 
munition, however, subjected it to tighter export regulations.123 Under 
ITAR, a seller of encryption software needed separate licenses before 
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exporting a munition. The applications for licenses required approval of the 
Defense Department and the National Security Agency.124 
On November 15, 1996, President Clinton issued an Executive Order 
transferring the regulation of “dual-use” encryption from the State 
Department to the Department of Commerce.125 This transfer of power 
allowed the Department of Commerce to control the exportation of all 
encryption technology that was not developed or used strictly for military 
purposes.126 The shift of power from the Department of Defense to the 
Department of Commerce benefited businesses that used or made 
encryption software.127 This significantly decreased the amount of time 
exporters waited for licenses to ship encryption products overseas.128 On 
January 12, 2000, the Clinton administration continued to eradicate export 
restrictions on encryption technology with the announcement that virtually 
all types of encryption programs could be exported without restriction.129 
The final blow to export restriction came in July 2000, with the 
announcement that all U.S. companies could export, without a license, any 
encryption products “to any end-user” in selected countries.130 
C. Attempts to Regulate Encryption Domestically 
Although the United States primarily focused on the regulation of 
encryption through export restrictions, its efforts briefly extended to 
domestic regulation. In 1993, the Clinton administration implemented the 
“Clipper Chip” initiative.131 Its purpose was to combat terrorists, drug 
traffickers, and spies who used encryption to elude law enforcement.132 The 
government planned to accomplish this bold goal by mandating that 
encryption technology be subject to a mandatory “key escrow” program.133 
The plan for the key escrow system required that a copy of the decryption 
keys be held for safekeeping by a Trusted Third Party (“TTP”).134 The 
Clipper Chip initiative was designed to allow businesses to use stronger  
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encryption systems, while ensuring that law enforcement could access the 
keys should the need arise.135 
Despite the government’s efforts to implement the Clipper Chip 
initiative, the program ultimately failed. Many viewed the key escrow 
system as one that would create an inferior product because it would not 
grant the protection businesses demanded from the encryption software.136 
The software industry, as well as the business community, argued that 
mandating encryption software be accessible by a third party created a 
“back door” through which one could access protected information.137 
Businesses at home and abroad feared the government would abuse its 
power to access the back door, thus obtaining confidential information 
“under the guise of law enforcement and national security.”138 The Clinton 
administration, unable to address these concerns and to satisfy those in the 
computer and business industries, eventually abandoned the Clipper Chip 
initiative.139 
IV.  THE EFFECT OF ENCRYPTION REGULATIONS: WOULD 
REGULATIONS STOP TERRORISM OR HURT THE ECONOMY? 
“Unfortunately, every time the United States has a lasting peace, it 
becomes complacent about security and overly focused on economic 
growth. History, however, has repeatedly admonished the United 
States that such a mistake may have mortal ramifications.”140 
With the terrorist attacks of September 11 fresh in our minds, many 
are compelled to ask one question: If encryption regulations had been in 
place, would the attacks still have occurred? In fact, two days after the 
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, some in 
Congress did more than ask the question.141 In a speech on the Senate floor, 
Senator Judd Gregg renewed the previous call for regulations on encryption 
products that had been resolved in recent years.142 Few of his colleagues 
from either side of the aisle answered the Senator’s call to arms. The reason 
for the silence in Congress was likely based on encryption’s previous 
regulatory history.143 Specifically, many thought the regulations would 
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cripple business and compromise individual privacy rather than prevent 
terrorist attacks.144 
Regulations that weakened the strength of encryption programs or 
that mandated back doors jeopardized security on the Internet and had 
major consequences on business as well as the economy. It is virtually 
undisputed that strong encryption is essential for providing security on the 
Internet. Faced with using altered encryption programs, businesses likely 
would be hesitant to use the technology because they would be unable to 
guarantee privacy for their customers. Without such security measures for 
those passing confidential information online, e-commerce and other 
industries dependent on encryption would suffer a crippling blow, dragging 
our economy with it. This move would not only weaken encryption for 
terrorists, but would also do the same to businesses and other industries  
as well.145 
Even if the government passed legislation that required mandatory 
back doors so law enforcement could access suspicious encrypted e-mails, 
other encryption programs without back doors are readily available.146 
Programs such as PGP have been available online and are currently sold 
without back doors. In addition, terrorists would not use encryption 
programs if law enforcement held the keys and a back way into their 
communications.147 Thus, even if previous regulations on encryption were 
revived, many terrorist groups would buy encryption programs in other 
countries without back doors to evade detection.148 
More importantly, the investigation into the terrorist attacks on 
September 11 revealed that encryption might have played a role.149 
Evidence suggests that in addition to using encryption, bin Laden’s 
organization also uses steganography.150 Steganography is a technique that 
hides messages within pictures, music, and other media.151 For example, 
after a plaintext message is encrypted, the message is hidden in a picture or 
MP3 file using a steganography software file.152 The hidden and encrypted 
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message would then be placed on a Web page and could be pulled up at 
any time by others. This ingenious process would prevent intelligence 
agencies from detecting that encrypted messages were being sent, not to 
mention maximizing the security of the communications. 
Thus, since previous regulations merely give the illusion of protection 
against terrorism while potentially crippling the American economy, a 
better solution must be ascertained. If restricting exportation, requiring 
licensing, or keeping key escrow accounts will not stop terrorists from 
secretly communicating through encrypted messages, then what will? Is 
there an option government regulators have yet to discuss? The answer lies 
in new FBI technology, that will allow the U.S. government to stare 
through the proverbial keyhole instead of using a brute force attack to kick 
down the door. 
V.  LEADING THE WAY WITH ITS MAGIC LANTERN: DOES NEW 
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION SOLVE THE ENCRYPTION PROBLEM? 
Finding a way to crack encryption has baffled law enforcement 
agencies. Historically, if the government discovered a suspicious e-mail 
that was encrypted and wanted to read it, it had two options—it could 
obtain the private-key from the sender, or it could attempt to break the code 
through a brute force attack.153 The first option, requiring terrorists to 
supply the private-key, is not plausible because this would reveal the 
investigation to the terrorists. In addition, those under investigation would 
not want to incriminate themselves if they were engaged in illegal activity. 
The second option, cracking the code by a brute force attack, is possible, 
but the process involves a massive amount of computer power and an 
equally large number of staff hours.154 Neither option is attractive. 
Furthermore, law enforcement’s efforts may be for naught, since the 
encrypted message could just as easily be directions to meet for a 
basketball game as it could be instructions to carry out a terrorist attack. 
What if, however, a third option existed? 
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A. What Is Magic Lantern and How Does It Work? 
A new project developed by the FBI, code-named Magic Lantern, has 
the capability of using the suspect’s own computer and unwittingly 
employs the suspect himself to provide law enforcement its own private 
encryption key.155 More specifically, Magic Lantern uses an existing 
program that logs all of the user’s keystrokes and places them in a memory 
application.156 This application enables the FBI to obtain access to the 
suspect’s encrypted information by logging the suspect’s keystrokes as he 
enters his password. The application then sends the password to the FBI at 
a remote location.157 In essence, Magic Lantern allows the FBI to record a 
suspect’s keystrokes and steal his private encryption key.158 
Originally, software companies developed keystroke-logging software 
for home use so parents could monitor their children’s activities on the 
Internet.159 Soon after, some employers installed the keystroke-logging 
software to monitor their employees’ computer habits while at work.160 
After discovering that hackers used keystroke-logging software to steal 
users’ passwords, the government realized how useful it could be to obtain 
criminals’ private-keys.161 Thus, the government developed Magic Lantern. 
Keystroke-logging software has advanced in recent years. Early 
attempts required FBI agents to enter the suspect’s home or office where 
the computer was located and place the device inside the keyboard.162 
Recently, however, the FBI has combined new technology with the 
keystroke-logging software to make it more versatile and effective.163 Now, 
the FBI’s Magic Lantern program merges the old idea of keystroke-logging 
with a Trojan Horse virus so that the information can be collected and 
transmitted without ever having to enter the suspect’s home or  
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business.164 The FBI can accomplish this task in one of two ways. The 
easiest of the two begins by sending e-mail to the suspect’s e-mail 
account.165 The message would likely resemble the junk e-mail we all 
receive166 or could even be attached to a family member’s e-mail.167 Once 
the suspect opens the message, the Trojan Horse virus, attached to the 
message, installs itself onto the suspect’s computer, and begins logging the 
suspect’s keystrokes.168 The second process involves law enforcement 
exploiting flaws in the operating system to enter the computer to install the 
program.169 In either case, the program would then record the keystrokes of 
the suspect, including the password to his encryption program, and transmit 
the information to the FBI while the suspect is online,170 possibly by e-
mail.171 
B. Magic Lantern Works: Case in Point 
The federal government has successfully employed Magic Lantern 
and used the information to convict a prominent mobster. Upon locating 
the suspect, the FBI obtained a court order from a federal magistrate to 
install the program.172 Using an older version of Magic Lantern, the FBI 
entered the office of New Jersey mobster Nicodemo Scarfo and planted 
keystroke loggers on all the office’s computers.173 By recording Scarfo’s 
keystrokes, the FBI was able to obtain his encryption keys and decrypt files 
that were later used in his prosecution for loan sharking and racketeering.174 
C. What Are the Implications of Magic Lantern? 
Many of the regulations that govern this new technology are 
contained in the U.S.A. Patriot Act.175 Under current law, law enforcement 
agencies that want to infect a computer with this Trojan Horse virus must 
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acquire a court order allowing them to place the program on a suspect’s 
computer.176 Under the U.S.A. Patriot Act, however, only a state or U.S. 
attorney general need approve the measure to begin the process, while a 
court order can come later. 
So far, Magic Lantern seems capable of curing many ills plaguing law 
enforcement. First and foremost, Magic Lantern turns the task of 
monitoring encrypted e-mail and other Internet traffic from a task that is 
nearly impossible to one as easy as obtaining approval. Second, the Fourth 
Amendment concerns raised by the FBI’s Carnivore system are diminished 
because Magic Lantern is directed at specific computers or specific e-mails, 
thus eliminating the need to cast the net too wide. These factors, when 
coupled with a form of judicial oversight, will provide law enforcement 
with the tools they need to investigate suspects while adhering to 
constitutional guarantees. 
D. Magic Lantern: Shining a Light on a New Solution 
The advent of the Internet has revolutionized the world. Through this 
new medium we can check movie listings, look up new recipes, download 
the latest music, and read newspapers written halfway around the world. 
The Internet’s most profound effect, however, lies in the booming market 
of e-commerce. Although the Internet contributed to record economic 
growth in the 1990s, that success was based on businesses ensuring the 
confidentiality of customers’ personal information. American businesses 
accomplished this task domestically and overseas by using limited-strength 
encryption programs and later, when the government abolished regulations 
limiting the strength of encryption technology, stronger programs. 
Although the abolition of encryption regulations proved necessary to 
e-commerce and helped vault the economy to record levels, the move had 
dire consequences on our national security. Businesses weren’t the only 
organizations using encryption to keep communications from prying eyes. 
Terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, saw encryption as a vehicle to 
keep its plans secret and to carry out its acts of terrorism undetected. 
It appears now that we have come full circle. The government began 
regulating encryption as munitions to ensure the technology would not fall 
into the hands of our enemies. Slowly, it backed down and relaxed the 
regulations to satisfy the needs of our evolving economy. As regulations 
relaxed, our economy strengthened, and so did terrorists’ capabilities. Now 
that terrorists have access to the technology, what can be done to regulate 
it? The solution lies not in reviving old regulations, but in implementing  
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new technologies. As technology evolves, so too must the government’s 
response to the problems new technology creates. 
The government has responded by creating Magic Lantern, a new 
technology that protects business while ensuring the nation’s security. Not 
only does Magic Lantern allow lax encryption regulation, but it also targets 
only those individuals who the government has probable cause to suspect 
of engaging in terrorist activities. It ensures privacy and protection for 
businesses while giving terrorists a false sense of security. Further, Magic 
Lantern should be governed by existing constitutional protections; thus, 
there would not be a need for additional regulations. Magic Lantern solves 
the problem of encryption regulation as it takes away the need to regulate 
encryption altogether. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, many are struggling with the 
thought that terrorism can strike at home as easily as it can abroad. 
Terrorism is no longer carried out with grenades, Molotov cocktails, or 
pipe bombs. The terrorists of today employ computers, the Internet, cell 
phones, steganography, and encryption. Using this technology, terrorist 
groups can carry out their plans in secret, while intelligence agencies are 
left to conduct their investigations after the fact. Although the widespread 
dissemination of encryption in the absence of government regulation may 
affect national security, we still must examine the effects of governmental 
regulation on businesses and individuals before reacting. E-commerce 
powered by the Internet has helped drive the American economy to record 
levels. Its success could not have been accomplished, however, if 
customers’ personal and private information could not be protected online 
by businesses. Past attempts at encryption regulation illustrate this is a 
delicate balance—a balance which has recently shifted in favor of business. 
While the business sector has won the battle, however, law enforcement is 
still effectively fighting the war with the development of new technologies 
that break the encryption barrier without raising the concerns of past 
regulatory efforts. 
 
